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Abstract: 
In this paper, a model of endogenous economic growth is developed with special focus on the 
interaction between unionized labour market and environmental pollution. We introduce a trade 
union; and use both ‘Efficient Bargaining’ model and ‘Right to Manage’ model to solve the 
negotiation problem. Environmental pollution is the result of production; and the labour union 
bargains not only for wage and employment but also for the protection of environment. We derive 
properties of optimum income tax policy while financing abatement expenditure; and also analyse the 
effects of unionization on the level of employment and on growth rate. It appears that the optimum 
rate of income tax varies inversely with the relative bargaining power of the labour union. An increase 
in the relative bargaining power of the labour union may enhance employment in ‘Efficient 
Bargaining’ model if the labour union is highly employment oriented. However, the union always 
forces the firm to raise the spending rate for environment protection. So, unionisation may raise the 
growth rate, even if the first effect is negative, but the second effect dominates the first effect.   
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1. Introduction: 
There exists a vast literature on endogenous growth theory; and a small set of models 
focuses on the effects of unionisation in the labour market on the long run rate of growth.1 
However, these models do not consider trade union’s concern about workers’ health and 
safety and environmental protection. Hence they cannot analyse how unionisation affects the 
growth rate of the economy through its positive role on environmental protection.  
Various empirical works point out that many labour unions fight hard for protection 
of workers’ health and working environment. For example, Gahan (2002) shows that 
workplace safety always remains in the set of priorities of the union. Khan et al. (2012a) 
presents evidences to show that labour unions struggle for environmental protection. Khan 
(2010) and Khan et al. (2012b) also justify trade unions’ role to protect environment. 
Valenduc (2001) points out that labour unions in Belgium have environmental awareness 
projects. Kawakami et al. (2004) points out that trade unions in Asia organize training 
workshop to improve workers’ safety and health. Stevis (2011) shows that, over the last two 
decades, labour unions have developed their environmental agendas consistent with their 
concerns about safety and health.  
There are also evidences to establish that labour unions negotiate for workers’ health 
and safety and for environment protection. Gray et al. (1998) studies many private-sector 
collective bargaining agreements in which health and safety provisions frequently appear. 
Magane et al. (1997) provides evidences of firm’s switching to eco-friendly production 
techniques due to struggle of labour unions for health and safety. Trade unions force firms to 
spend for improvement in workers’ health and safety condition in the workplace; and this, in 
turn, leads to improvement of the broader natural environment. Magane et al. (1997), Davies 
(1993) and Dembo et al. (1988) also think that workplace environment should be seen as part 
of the broader natural environment. The disasters of Thor Chemicals in South Africa, Union 
Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, Sandoz warehouse in Basel, Switzerland, Nuclear power plant 
in Chernobyl, Soviet Union etc. also support the link between the global natural 
environmental disasters and industrial environment problem in the workplace. These 
empirical findings and views motivate us to analyse whether trade unions’ role to protect 
workers’ health and safety has an impact on environmental quality as well as on economic 
1 The set includes the works of Bräuninger (2000), Lingens (2003a, 2003b), Irmen and Wigger (2002/2003), 
Sorensen (1997), Palokangas (1996), Chang et al. (2007), Lai and Wang (2010), Ramos-Parren˜o and Sa´nchez-
Losada (2002) etc.  
                                                            
growth. To the best of our knowledge, this aspect has not received proper attention in the 
existing theoretical literature.  
A few models analyse properties of optimal income tax used to finance the abatement 
expenditure in the presence of environmental pollution2. However, all these models assume 
competitive labour market with full employment equilibrium. So it is important to analyse 
whether optimal tax policy used to finance public abatement expenditure in a unionized 
economy differs from that in a competitive economy especially when the labour union can 
force the firm to spend for environmental development.  
The present paper is an attempt to analyse both. On the one hand, it analyses the effect 
of unionisation in the labour market on the long run economic growth rate in the presence of 
environmental pollution; and, on the other hand, it analyses the properties of an optimum 
income tax policy designed to finance public abatement expenditure when labour unions 
bargain for workers’ health and safety and for environment development. We consider two 
alternative bargaining models to analyse the negotiation problem – the ‘Efficient bargaining 
model’ of McDonald and Solow (1981) and the ‘Right to manage model’ of Nickell and 
Andrews (1983).  
 We derive interesting results from this model. First, growth rate maximising rate of 
income tax used to finance public abatement expenditure varies inversely with the relative 
bargaining power of the labour union. Secondly, how unionisation affects employment 
depends on the nature of bargaining. In the ‘Efficient bargaining model’, unionisation raises 
employment level only if the labour union is highly employment oriented. Otherwise, it 
always lowers the level of employment. Thirdly, the effect on economic growth depends 
partly on the employment effect and partly on the effect on employer’s spending to protect 
environment; and this is valid for each of the two bargaining models. Since the environmental 
protection effect is always positive, it may outweigh the employment effect even if it is 
negative; and thus unionisation may have a positive effect on economic growth even when 
unions are wage oriented. Such a result cannot be obtained in Chang et al. (2007) because this 
positive environment development effect of unionisation does not exist in that model.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic model with an 
‘Efficient Bargaining’ theory. Section 3 analyses the properties of the growth rate 
2 Gupta and Barman (2009, 2010, 2013), Barman and Gupta (2010), Economides and Philippopoulos (2008), 
Greiner (2005) etc.  
                                                            
maximising tax policy. Effects of unionisation on growth rate are analysed in section 4. These 
results are compared to the corresponding results obtained from the ‘Right to Manage’ model 
analysed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. The model: 
2.1 Firms: 
The representative competitive firm produces the final good, 𝑌𝑌, using private capital, 
𝐾𝐾, labour, 𝐿𝐿, average economy wide stock of capital, 𝐾𝐾�, and environmental quality, E.3 The 
production function of the final good is given by4            𝑌𝑌 = 𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾�,𝐸𝐸) = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿                                                                                        (1) 
satisfying   𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽, 𝛿𝛿 ∈ (0,1) ,   𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 < 1   and  A > 0 .            
Existence of decreasing returns to private inputs leads to a positive profit if employers’ 
association owns a positive degree of bargaining power. Following Chang et al. (2007), we 
assume that a fixed quantity of land is essential for a firm; and thus the number of firms is 
fixed even in the presence of positive profit.5 
The firm maximises profit, 𝜋𝜋, defined as            𝜋𝜋 = 𝑌𝑌 − 𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾   .                                                                                                          (2) 
Here 𝛾𝛾 is the rate of firm’s expenditure incurred to protect environment. w and r represent the 
wage rate and rental rate on private capital respectively.  
2.2 Capital market: 
3 An improvement in environmental quality leads to an improvement of health capital of workers and an 
increase in efficiency of public capital. As Gupta and Barman (2009) writes “There are various ways by which 
degradation of environmental quality reduces the effective benefit of public investment expenditure. For 
example, deforestation reduces rainfall; and this, in turn, reduces the efficiency of the public irrigation 
programme by reducing the canals' water flow and lowering the recharging rate of groundwater. Poor quality 
of natural resources (coal) and the lack of current in the river water negatively affect the generation of 
electricity. Global warming leads to natural disasters like floods, earthquakes, cyclones, etc.; and these, in turn, 
cause severe damage to infrastructural capitals like roads, electric lines, power plants, buildings, industrial 
plants, etc. Water pollution and air pollution cause various diseases; and hence the public health expenditure 
programme fails to provide the desired benefit to the workers which, in turn, lowers their efficiency.”. Gupta 
and Barman (2009, 2010, 2013), Barman and Gupta (2010), Economides and Philippopoulos (2008), Greiner 
(2005) etc. include environmental quality as an input in the production function.  
4 Chang et al. (2007) also assumes similar production function where average economy wide stock of capital 
enters as an input in the production function. However, they do not consider the productive role of 
environmental quality in the production process.  
5 Number of firms is normalised to unity.  
                                                            
Private capital market is perfectly competitive; and so the supply-demand equality 
determines the equilibrium value of the perfectly flexible rental rate on capital. Demand 
function for capital is derived from firms’ profit maximizing behaviour; and the inverted 
demand function is given by  
          𝑟𝑟 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−1𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌
𝐾𝐾
     .                                                               (3) 
2.3 Environment: 
Following Greiner (2005), we consider environmental quality, E, as a flow variable 
satisfying public input properties. Following Gupta and Barman (2010), Barman and Gupta 
(2010), Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) and Greiner (2005), we assume that 
production of the final good is the only source of emission6; and public abatement 
expenditure incurred by the government can improve environmental quality. However, we 
also consider firms’ role to protect environment. Firms are forced to spend for environmental 
development by the bargaining power of the labour union. For example, firms may use costly 
eco-friendly techniques of production or may allocate resources to non-productive activities 
for the sake of workers’ health and safety. This aspect has not been considered in the existing 
literature on labour unions. The environmental quality function is given by            𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸(𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌, 𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌, 𝑣𝑣𝑌𝑌)  with   𝐸𝐸1 > 0,     𝐸𝐸2 > 0  and   𝐸𝐸3 < 0    .                                         (4) 
Here 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸 is the rate of income tax used to finance public abatement expenditure and v is the 
emission - output coefficient. We specify a simple functional form given by            𝐸𝐸 = (𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 + 𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌)𝜇𝜇(𝑣𝑣𝑌𝑌)−𝜇𝜇 = (𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸 + 𝛾𝛾)𝜇𝜇𝑣𝑣−𝜇𝜇   .                                                                   (4.𝑎𝑎) 
Here ((𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸 + 𝛾𝛾) 𝑣𝑣⁄ ) represents the effective abatement activity per unit of pollution; and 𝜇𝜇 >0 is the elasticity of environmental quality with respect to this argument.  
2.4 Labour union’s utility function:  
The labour union derives utility from three arguments: (i) the hike in the wage rate 
over the competitive wage rate,7 (ii) level of employment and (iii) firm’s spending rate to 
6 There may be many other sources, for example - consumption of pollution intensive goods, extracting natural 
resources etc.  
7 Some works assume that the difference between the bargained wage rate and the unemployment benefit is an 
argument in the labour union’s utility function. Contrary to this, Irmen and Wigger (2003), Lingens (2003a) and 
Lai and Wang (2010) assume that the difference between the bargained wage rate and the competitive wage rate 
                                                            
protect environment. The third argument is generally not considered in the existing literature. 
The utility function is given by            𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇 = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐)𝜀𝜀1𝐿𝐿𝜀𝜀2𝛾𝛾𝜀𝜀3    with   𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 > 0   for  𝑗𝑗 =  1, 2, 3  .                                                  (5) 
Here 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇 and 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 stand for the utility of the labour union and the competitive wage rate 
respectively. 𝜀𝜀1, 𝜀𝜀2 and 𝜀𝜀3 are three non-negative parameters representing degrees of 
orientation of the labour union towards those arguments. If 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀{𝜀𝜀1, 𝜀𝜀2, 𝜀𝜀3}, then the 
labour union is called jth argument oriented.   
 In a competitive labour market, perfectly flexible wage rate is equated to the marginal 
productivity of labour and labour is fully employed. The firm is not forced to spend for 
environmental development; and hence 𝛾𝛾 = 0. So, with labour endowment being normalized 
to unity, we have            𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿     .                                                                                                               (6) 
2.5 The ‘Efficient bargaining model’: 
In this section, we choose the ‘Efficient bargaining model’ where wage rate, level of 
employment and the rate of firm’s spending to protect environment are determined jointly by 
the labour union and the employer’s association; and they maximize the ‘generalised Nash 
product’ function given by           𝜓𝜓 = ( 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇 − 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇����)𝜃𝜃(𝜋𝜋 − 𝜋𝜋�)(1−𝜃𝜃)    .                                                                                            (7) 
Here 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇���� and 𝜋𝜋� symbolize the reservation utility level of the labour union and the reservation 
profit level of the firm respectively. Bargaining disagreement stops production and hence 
results into zero employment, which, in turn, implies that 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇���� = 0 and 𝜋𝜋� = 0. 𝜃𝜃 ∈ (0,1) 
represents the relative bargaining power of the labour union. Unionisation in the labour 
market implies an exogenous increase in the value of 𝜃𝜃.  
Using equations (2) and (3), we obtain            𝜋𝜋 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿  .                                                                                                   (8) 
is an argument in the labour union’s utility function. Since the provision of unemployment benefit is not 
considered in this model, so we incorporate the difference between the bargained wage rate and the competitive 
wage rate as an argument in the labour union’s utility function.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 Finally, using equations (5), (7) and (8), we obtain            𝜓𝜓 = {(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐)𝜀𝜀1𝐿𝐿𝜀𝜀2𝛾𝛾𝜀𝜀3}𝜃𝜃{(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿}(1−𝜃𝜃)   .                                              (9) 
Here 𝜓𝜓 is to be maximised with respect to w, 𝐿𝐿 and 𝛾𝛾. Using equations (1) and (6), and the 
three first order conditions of optimisation, we solve for optimal w, 𝐿𝐿 and 𝛾𝛾. These are given 
by8 
          𝐿𝐿∗ = �(1 − 𝛼𝛼){𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1) − 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)}
𝛽𝛽{(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)} � 11−𝛽𝛽 ;                                                         (10) 
          𝑤𝑤∗ = {𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2}𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐{𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}     ;                                                                          (11) 
and 
          𝛾𝛾∗ = 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)    .                                                                                  (12) 
To ensure positive values of 𝐿𝐿∗ and 𝑤𝑤∗ and to ensure 𝐿𝐿∗ < 1, we need a parametric 
restriction. This is given by 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴:       −  𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1) < 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜀𝜀1) < 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)   . 
From equation (10), we obtain  
          𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= [𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜀𝜀1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜀𝜀3]𝐿𝐿∗{(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}{𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1) − 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)}   .               (10.𝑎𝑎) 
 Here the denominator in the R.H.S. of equation (10.a) is always positive. So 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
> 0 if 
and only if 𝜀𝜀2 > 𝜀𝜀1 + 𝛽𝛽𝜀𝜀3. This means that an increase in union’s relative bargaining power 
may raise the employment level if the union is highly employment oriented.   
Chang et al. (2007) does not consider trade union’s concern about environment 
development; and hence 𝜀𝜀3 = 0 there. So sign of �𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿∗𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃� depends solely on the sign of (𝜀𝜀2 −
𝜀𝜀1). However, in our analysis, 𝜀𝜀3 > 0 and the nature of the employment effect depends on the 
magnitude of 𝜀𝜀3.  
8 See Appendix A for derivation. 
                                                            
The intuition behind this can be explained as follows. The labour union wants to raise 
L with a rise in 𝜃𝜃 if it obtains a marginal utility of L higher than its marginal opportunity cost. 
In the case of Chang et al. (2007), i.e. in the absence of trade union’s concern for 
environment development, opportunity cost of raising L is same as the loss in utility from not 
raising w. However, in the present model, this opportunity cost also includes the loss in utility 
from not raising 𝛾𝛾. Hence 𝜀𝜀3 enters into the picture.      
Equation (11) shows that the negotiated wage rate, 𝑤𝑤∗, exceeds the competitive 
equilibrium wage rate, 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐. From this equation, we obtain  
          𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= {𝛽𝛽𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐{𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}2 > 0    .                                                          (11.𝑎𝑎) 
So 𝑤𝑤∗ varies positively with 𝜃𝜃. This is obvious because the labour union always derives 
higher utility from a higher wage; and so it receives a higher wage with a greater bargaining 
power.  
From equation (12), we obtain    
          𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= 𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽){(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}2 > 0    .                                                             (12.𝑎𝑎) 
An increase in 𝜃𝜃 forces the firm to spend a higher fraction of output on environment 
development because the labour union always derives higher utility from a higher value of 𝛾𝛾.  
Second order conditions of maximization of 𝜓𝜓 are also satisfied9; and we now state 
the following proposition.  
Proposition 1: Unionisation defined as an increase in the relative bargaining power of the 
labour union always raises the wage rate as well as the firm’s spending rate to protect 
environment but raises employment level only if the labour union is highly employment 
oriented.  
2.6 Households: 
The representative household derives instantaneous utility only from consumption of 
the final good.10 She maximises her discounted present value of instantaneous utility over the 
9 See Appendix A for derivation.  
                                                            
infinite time horizon subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. The household’s problem 
is given by the following.    
         𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀� 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌∞
0
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶                                                                                                          (13) 
subject to,      ?̇?𝐾 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸)𝑌𝑌 − 𝑐𝑐        ;                                                                                           (14)                          𝐾𝐾(0) = 𝐾𝐾0    (𝐾𝐾0 is historically given) 
and       𝑐𝑐 ∈ [0, (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸)𝑌𝑌]   .      
Here c denotes the level of consumption of the representative household. c is the control 
variable and K is the state variable. 𝜎𝜎 and ρ are the elasticity of marginal utility with respect 
to consumption and the constant rate of discount of consumption respectively. Savings is 
always invested; and private capital does not depreciate. 
Solving this dynamic optimisation problem, we obtain the growth rate of consumption 
given by 
          𝑔𝑔 = ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼 𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿 − 𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎
 .                                                                             (15) 
2.8 Equilibrium:    
 At the symmetric equilibrium, 𝐾𝐾� = 𝐾𝐾; and hence, from equations (3), (6) and (15), we 
obtain           𝑟𝑟 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿      ;                                                                                                         (3.𝑎𝑎)           𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿                                                                                                                              (6.𝑎𝑎) 
and 
          𝑔𝑔 = ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿 − 𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎
 .                                                                                        (15.𝑎𝑎) 
10 We assume that households supply constant amount of labour; and so labour - leisure choice of representative 
household is ruled out. We also do not consider environmental quality as an argument in household’s utility 
function for the sake of simplicity even though we incorporate trade union’s concern about environmental 
effects. This exclusion is a restrictive one.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
It looks like an AK model and there is no transitional dynamics. At equilibrium, employment 
of labour, tax rate, rental rate of capital, environmental quality, 𝛾𝛾∗ all are time-independent. 
So the growth rate of consumption given by equation (15.a) is also time-independent. Capital 
stock, K, final output, Y, negotiated wage rate, 𝑤𝑤∗, firm’s profit, π, also grow at that rate in 
the steady-state equilibrium.    
3. Optimal tax rate: 
 We first derive the growth rate maximising income tax rate. Using equations (4.a) and 
(15.a), we obtain the growth rate maximising income tax rate, 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸∗, given by11 
           𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸∗ = �𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾∗1+𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿 �      .                                                                                                                 (16) 
We assume the following parametric restriction to ensure that 0 < 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸∗ < 1.  
          𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿 > 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)
𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + (1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2)   . 
Using equations (12) and (16), we obtain  
          𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸∗ = �𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿[(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)] − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 + 𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿)[(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)] �     .                                     (16.𝑎𝑎) 
From equation (16.a), we obtain   
          𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= − 𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽){(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}2(1 + 𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿) < 0     .                                           (17) 
Equation (17) implies that an increase in 𝜃𝜃 lowers 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸∗. This is so because this raises 𝛾𝛾∗ 
which, in turn, upgrades environmental quality and thus lowers the marginal benefit of public 
abatement expenditure.  
Proposition 2: Optimum rate of income tax used to finance public abatement expenditure 
varies inversely with the bargaining power of the labour union.  
Here we do not incorporate environmental quality in the household’s utility function. 
So there exists a positive monotonic relationship between the growth rate and welfare level. 
So the growth rate maximising tax rate is identical to the welfare maximising tax rate.   
11 Second order condition of maximisation of the balanced growth rate is satisfied. 
                                                            
4. Growth effect of unionisation: 
We now analyse the effect of an increase in 𝜃𝜃 on the endogenous growth rate. Using 
equations (4.a), (16.a) and (15.a) and putting 𝛾𝛾 = 𝛾𝛾∗ and 𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿∗, we obtain 
          𝑔𝑔∗ = 𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿∗𝛽𝛽 �𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿𝑣𝑣 �𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿 (1+𝛾𝛾∗)𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇+1(1+𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿)𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇+1 − 𝜌𝜌
𝜎𝜎
     .                                                                                 (18) 
From equation (18), we have  
          𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃






+ (1 + 𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿) 𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾∗𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃(1 + 𝛾𝛾∗)�          .                             (19) 
Equation (19) shows that the effect of an increase in 𝜃𝜃 on the growth rate, 𝑔𝑔∗, is ambiguous. 
The first term inside the bracket on the right hand side of equation (19) represents the 




and so it depends on the nature of labour union’s orientation towards arguments in its utility 
function. However, the second term inside this bracket is definitely positive because equation 
(12.a) shows that 𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾
∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
> 0. This term represents the environment development effect on 
growth due to unionisation. So the effect of unionisation on the growth rate may be 
qualitatively different from its employment effect.   
In Chang et al. (2007), the environment development effect on growth does not exist. 
Hence the growth effect of unionisation is qualitatively identical to the employment effect in 
that model; and hence its nature is determined by the nature of orientation of the labour 
union. So the growth effect is positive (negative) when the union is employment (wage) 
oriented. However, in the present model where environment development effect exists, nature 
of the orientation of the labour union alone cannot determine the nature of the growth effect. 
If the environment development effect dominates the employment effect, then unionisation 
always raises the growth rate regardless of the nature of orientation of the labour union. 
Growth effect may be positive even if the employment effect is negative, i.e., if the union is 
wage oriented.  
We can establish the following proposition.  
Proposition 3: Unionisation in the labour market must (may) raise the endogenous growth 
rate if the labour union is employment (wage) oriented.  
Since there exists a positive monotonic relationship between growth rate and welfare, 
welfare effects of unionisation are identical to its growth effects.  
5. The ‘Right to manage model’ case: 
In the ‘Right to manage model’, two parties bargain over w and 𝛾𝛾. The individual firm 
determines L from its labour demand function derived from its profit maximising behaviour; 
and it is given by           𝑤𝑤 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1     .                                                     (20) 
Using equations (8) and (20), we have           𝜋𝜋 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑌𝑌        ;                                                                                               (21) 
and hence the ‘generalised Nash product’ function is obtained as follows.            𝜓𝜓 = {(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐)𝜀𝜀1𝐿𝐿𝜀𝜀2𝛾𝛾𝜀𝜀3}𝜃𝜃{(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑌𝑌}(1−𝜃𝜃)    .                                               (22) 
In this model, 𝜓𝜓 is to be maximised with respect to w and 𝛾𝛾, subject to equation (20). 
Optimum values of w and 𝛾𝛾 are same as those obtained in the ‘Efficient bargaining model’. 
However, employment level is different; and is given by12 
         𝐿𝐿∗∗ = � (1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2){𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1) − 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)}{𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2}[(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)]� 11−𝛽𝛽    .                                     (23) 
Comparing equation (23) to equation (10) we find that 𝐿𝐿∗∗ ≠ 𝐿𝐿∗.   
Condition A guarantees that 𝐿𝐿∗∗ > 0; equation (23) clearly shows that 𝐿𝐿∗∗ < 1 because 
𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1) > 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2). Second order conditions of maximisation are also satisfied.  
Both government’s objective and representative household’s objective are same in 
both the models. So equations and solutions derived are also same in these two models. 
Optimal tax rate is also identical.  
From equation (23), we have 
12 See Appendix C for detailed derivations of the section 5. 
                                                            
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿∗∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= −� 𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2)[(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)]+ 𝛽𝛽𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽){𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1) − 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)}{𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2}� < 0       .                     (24) 
So an increase in 𝜃𝜃 definitely lowers 𝐿𝐿∗∗; and this implies that employment effect of 
unionisation is negative. This result is contradictory to the result obtained in the ‘Efficient 
bargaining model’ where the nature of the employment effect depends on the mathematical 
sign of (𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜀𝜀1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜀𝜀3).   
Effects of unionisation on the wage rate, firm’s environment development 
expenditure, and on optimum tax rates in this model are qualitatively similar to corresponding 
effects obtained in the previous model. Equation (18) is otherwise valid here except that 𝐿𝐿∗ is 
replaced by 𝐿𝐿∗∗. So the effect of unionisation on the rate of growth is given by   
          𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔∗∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃






+ (1 + 𝜇𝜇𝛿𝛿) 𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾∗𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃(1 + 𝛾𝛾∗)�          .                        (25) 
Here the first term and the second term of the right hand side of equation (25) are negative 
and positive respectively. So unionisation on the one hand lowers the growth rate through 
negative employment effect and on the other hand raises it through positive environment 
development effect; and the net effect depends on the relative strength of these two. 
Important results are summarized in the following proposition.     
Proposition 4: If the ‘Right to manage model’ of bargaining is introduced, unionisation in 
the labour market always lowers employment level regardless of its nature of orientation; 
and so unionisation raises the growth rate if and only if the positive environment 
development effect dominates the negative employment effect.  
6. Conclusions: 
This paper, on the one hand, investigates the effect of unionisation in the labour 
market on the long run growth rate of an economy in the presence of environmental pollution 
and trade union’s concern about environment development, and, on the other hand, derives 
properties of the optimum income tax policy designed to finance public abatement 
expenditure. Here we use two alternative versions of bargaining models – the ‘Efficient 
bargaining model’ of McDonald and Solow (1981) and the ‘Right to manage model’ of 
Nickell and Andrews (1983).  
 Our major findings are as follows. First, negotiated wage rate and firm’s spending rate 
to protect environment varies positively with degree of unionisation in the labour market. 
Secondly, the optimum rate of income tax used to finance public abatement expenditure 
varies inversely with this degree of unionisation. Existing literature on unionisation and 
growth does not focus on the sensitivity of optimal tax policy to the degree of unionisation. 
These two results hold for both versions of bargaining models. Thirdly, effects of 
unionisation on employment level and on economic growth depend on the nature of the 
bargaining model considered. In the case of ‘Efficient bargaining model’ unionisation may 
raise employment level only if the labour union is highly employment oriented. Otherwise, it 
is always harmful for the level of employment. Effect of unionisation on the long run growth 
rate partly depends on its employment effect and partly on its environment development 
effect. If the positive second effect dominates the negative first effect, then unionisation 
produces net positive effect on growth and on welfare. The importance of this positive 
environment development effect is not discussed in the existing theoretical literature. 
However, results of Chang et al. (2007) appear to be special cases of our results obtained in 
the absence of environment development effect.   
 However, our model is abstract and fails to consider many aspects of reality. We rule 
out the possibility of human capital accumulation, population growth, technological progress 
etc. Hence the allocation of government’s budget and household’s income towards education, 
R&D etc. is not analysed here. We assume ‘closed shop union’ for simplicity and do not 
consider ‘open shop union’, which is more common in reality. We plan to do further research 
in future attempting to get rid of these limitations. 
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Appendix:  
Appendix A: ‘Efficient bargaining model’   
First order conditions:  
From equations (9) and (1), we have            𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝜓𝜓 = 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝛾𝛾                              +(1 − 𝜃𝜃) 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔�(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿�      .                          (A. 1) 
The first order conditions of maximization of log 𝜓𝜓 are given by the followings.            𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1
𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐
+ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(−𝐿𝐿){(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿} = 0   ;                                             (A. 2)           𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2
𝐿𝐿
+ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿 − 𝑤𝑤�{(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿} = 0     ;                                (A. 3) 
and           𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3
𝛾𝛾
+ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�−(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿�{(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿} = 0     .                                                   (A. 4) 
Now using equations (A.2), (A.3) and (6), we have 
⇒     (𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)𝑤𝑤 = 𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 − 𝜀𝜀2𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐     .                                                          (A. 5) 
From equations (A.2) and (6), we obtain           𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1 �(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽 − 𝑤𝑤� = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐)   .                                            (A. 6) 
Using Equations (A.5) and (A.6), we obtain           𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1 = 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼){𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)}    .                                        (A. 7) 
From equation (A.4), we obtain           𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3
𝛾𝛾
= (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿�{(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿 − 𝑤𝑤}    .                                                         (A. 8) 
Using equations (A.5), (A.7), (A.8) and (6), we obtain  
⇒     𝛾𝛾 = {1 − 𝛽𝛽}𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3{𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)} + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3{1 − 𝛽𝛽}   .                                                                                 (A. 9) 
Equation (A.9) is identical to equation (12) in the body of the paper. 
Using equations (A.9) and (A.7), we have           𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1 = 𝛽𝛽[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3{1 − 𝛽𝛽}](1 − 𝛼𝛼){𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)}       .                                                (A. 10) 
From equation (A.10), we obtain equation (10) in the body of the paper.  
Using equations (A.7) and (A.5), we have               𝑤𝑤 = 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2{𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)}𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐     .                                                                   (A. 11) 
Equation (A.11) is identical to equation (11) in the body of the paper.   
Derivation of Condition A: 
We derive Condition A as follows. To ensure positive values of 𝐿𝐿∗ and 𝑤𝑤∗, we need the 
following parametric restriction.  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴1:           𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1) > 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)13    .   
Again, labour employment has to be less than its endowment i.e., 𝐿𝐿∗ < 1; and so the 
following parametric restriction is needed.  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴2:            (1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜀𝜀1) < 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛽𝛽)  . 
Combining these two conditions 𝐴𝐴1 and 𝐴𝐴2, we obtain condition A given in the body of the 
paper.  
Second order conditions:  
Using equations (A.2) and (6), we have            𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
= −  𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(𝑤𝑤 −𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐)2 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐
𝛽𝛽
− 𝑤𝑤�
2 < 0  .                      (A. 12) 




− (1 − 𝜃𝜃) .  









(1−𝛾𝛾)(1−𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1(1−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐{𝛽𝛽(1−𝜃𝜃)+𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1−𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1−𝜀𝜀2)}+�(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 − 𝑤𝑤�2�










⎤ < 0  .                  (A. 13) 
From equations (A.4) and (6), we have 









�(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽−1 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐
𝛽𝛽
− 𝑤𝑤�
2 < 0    .                                  (A. 14) 
Now, using equations (A.12), (A.11) and (A.7), we have            𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
= − {𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)}2(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1)
𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝜃𝜃)       .                    (A. 15) 
Using equations (A.13), (A.11) and (A.7), we have           𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿2
= − (1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2)[𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2]
𝐿𝐿2(1 − 𝜃𝜃)           .                                               (A. 16) 
Again using equations (A.14), (A.9), (A.11) and (A.7), we have 
13 Condition 𝐴𝐴1 also ensures that negotiated wage rate is higher than the competitive wage rate.  
                                                            
          𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾2
= − [{𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)} + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3{1 − 𝛽𝛽}]2(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3      .                       (A. 17) 
Now from equations (A.2), (A.7), (A.11) and (6), we have           𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 ∂w = − [1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2]{𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜀𝜀1 − 𝜀𝜀2)}𝐿𝐿(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝛽𝛽)     .                         (A. 18) 






𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 ∂w �2                                      = {𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}3[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)]
𝐿𝐿2𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1 > 0    .           (A. 19) 
Again from equations (6), (A.3), (A.7), (A.10) and (A.11), we have           𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 ∂𝛾𝛾
= − [𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2][𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3{1 − 𝛽𝛽}]
𝐿𝐿(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽) < 0    ;               (A. 20) 
and from equations (6), (A.2), (A.7), (A.11), we have           𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤
= {𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3{1 − 𝛽𝛽}]
−(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐{1 − 𝛽𝛽}2                                                                                                                                      < 0  .               (A. 21) 






𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 ∂w . 𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾                = �{𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}3[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3{1 − 𝛽𝛽}]
𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿(1 − 𝛽𝛽)3𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐2 � > 0    .   (A. 22) 
From equations (A.18), (A.20), (A.16) and (A.21), we have            𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 ∂w .𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 − 𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿2 . 𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 = 0   .                                              (A. 23) 








































               = − [𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3{1 − 𝛽𝛽}]3{𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}3
𝜃𝜃2𝜀𝜀3𝜀𝜀1𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐2𝐿𝐿2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)4(1 − 𝜃𝜃) < 0.    (A. 24) 
 
Appendix B: Derivation of equations of section 5  
Bargaining: First order conditions 
From equations (1), (20) and (22), we obtain  
         𝜓𝜓 = (𝑤𝑤 −𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐)θ𝜀𝜀1 �(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 �𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2+𝛽𝛽(1−𝜃𝜃)1−𝛽𝛽 𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1−𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1−𝜃𝜃)                                                                        �𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛿𝛿�(1−𝜃𝜃)     .                                              (B. 1) 
The first order conditions of maximisation 𝜓𝜓 with respect to w and 𝛾𝛾 are given by           𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕w = θ𝜀𝜀1(𝑤𝑤 −𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐) − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑤𝑤 = 0                                                                  (B. 2) 
and          𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾
= −𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(1 − 𝛽𝛽) − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3𝛾𝛾 = 0                                                     (B. 3) 
From equation (B.2), we obtain          𝑤𝑤 = [𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)][𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)]𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐     .                                                                       (B. 4) 
Equation (B.4) is identical to equation (11) in the body of the paper. 
 From equation (B.3), we obtain          𝛾𝛾 = 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)]    .                                                                                (B. 5) 
Equation (B.5) is same as equation (12) in the body of the paper.  
Using equations (B.4), (B.5) and (20), we obtain 
         𝐿𝐿 = �[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)][𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)][𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)][𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)]� 11−𝛽𝛽      .                                     (B. 6) 
Equation (B.6) is same as equation (23) in the body of the paper.  
Second order conditions: 
From equations (B.2) and (B.4), we obtain          𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
= − [𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)]3
𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)] < 0     .                                            (B. 7) 
From equation (B.3), we obtain          𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾2
= − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛾𝛾)2(1 − 𝛽𝛽) − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3𝛾𝛾2 < 0    .                                                                (B. 8) 
and          𝜕𝜕2𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔(𝜓𝜓)
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤
= 0   .                                                                                                                       (B. 9) 









= [𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)]3
𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)] � 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛾𝛾)2(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3𝛾𝛾2 � > 0  .   (B. 10) 
Employment effect: 
From equation (23), we obtain  
         (1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿∗∗𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
𝐿𝐿∗∗
= 𝜀𝜀2 − 1[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)] + 𝜀𝜀2 − 𝛽𝛽 − 𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)]                                                        − 𝜀𝜀2 − 𝛽𝛽[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)] − 𝜀𝜀2 − 1 + 𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)] 
⇒     𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿∗∗𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
𝐿𝐿∗∗
= −𝛽𝛽𝜀𝜀1[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)][𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀1(1 − 𝛽𝛽)]                                − 𝜀𝜀3[𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)][𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃𝜀𝜀3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)]     .                             (B. 11) 
From equation (B.11), we obtain equation (24) in the body of the paper.  
Derivations of other equations in this section are similar to those in the previous model.   
 
 
